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Abstract
Cloud computing has made it possible for a user to be able to select a computing service precisely
when needed. However, certain factors such as security of data and regulatory issues will impact
a user’s choice of using such a service. A solution to these problems is the use of a hybrid cloud
that combines a user’s local computing capabilities (for mission- or organization-critical tasks) with
a public cloud (for less influential tasks). We foresee three challenges that must be overcome before
the adoption of a hybrid cloud approach: 1) data design: How to partition relations in a hybrid
cloud? The solution to this problem must account for the sensitivity of attributes in a relation as
well as the workload of a user; 2) data security : How to protect a user’s data in a public cloud with
encryption while enabling query processing over this encrypted data? and 3) query processing : How
to execute queries efficiently over both, encrypted and unencrypted data? This paper addresses these
challenges and incorporates their solutions into an add-on tool for a Hadoop and Hive based cloud
computing infrastructure.
1 Introduction
The emergence of cloud computing has created a paradigm shift by allowing parallel processing of massive
amounts of data. Cloud computing has further segmented traditionally provided software services into
SaaS, PaaS and IaaS. This segmentation allows users to choose the appropriate kind of computing service
precisely when needed. Further, using cloud computing services can significantly lower a user’s capital
expenditure since they only pay for services that they use. However, a user needs to make an informed
decision as to whether or not to use cloud services based on other factors such as the level of information
privacy desired, regulatory issues and local computing capacity. A user may be tempted to use other
secure data processing alternatives such as full homomorphic encryption [1]. Unfortunately such methods
are very expensive as the the data size increases. Given these issues, for certain users it may be a better
choice to adopt a hybrid cloud (public and private) approach rather than relying solely on a cloud
service provider. Further, this hybrid solution enables certain mission- or organization-critical tasks to
be executed locally at a user’s site while allowing less important tasks to be outsourced to the public
cloud. Moreover, this increases throughput while reducing operational costs with a high-level of data
security.
There are a number of technological issues that need to be addressed before the adoption of a hybrid
cloud methodology. The first issue is, how to distribute data in a hybrid cloud? This is the data design
problem which focuses on how data should be partitioned and where these partitions should be placed.
The main reasons for data distribution are scalability, higher concurrency and greater throughput. There
are a number of related design issues such as granularity of partitions and application requirements.
Data design, especially in the cloud computing paradigm is a challenging task. This is because certain
attributes of a user’s data may be sensitive, in which case the user cannot release this information to
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a cloud service provider unless it is encrypted. Our data design module takes into account this factor
during the process of data fragmentation and fragment allocation.
The next issue is, how do users protect themselves from cloud service providers who may be able
to access their data? This issue is related to data security and is relevant for users since their data is
placed at the provider’s site. The goal of data security is to prevent the service provider from learning
any meaningful information from the data. Data security can be achieved by encrypting the stored
data. However, encryption presents a new set of challenges such as granularity of encryption and query
processing over encrypted data. Our security module addresses these challenges.
Figure 1: The hybrid cloud architecture
The final issue is, how can users query the cloud infrastructure without being aware of the separation
of data in a hybrid cloud? This is the problem of query processing in a distributed environment. The goal
of a cloud query processor is to transform a high-level query into a low-level query that can be executed
over a hybrid cloud. This query processor must be able to take into account the cost of executing queries
over a hybrid cloud containing both, unencrypted and encrypted data. Further, this query processor
must be able to optimize query execution given the fragmentation of relations as well as the sensitivity
of attributes. Our query processing module solves these problems effectively.
Figure 1 presents the architecture of our proposed system. A user submits the original set of relations,
R = {R1, R2, · · · , Rm} and input queries, Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk}. The data design layer vertically
partitions the set of attributes A = {A1, A2, . . . , An} over all relations R into Apu and Apr which are
the sets of attributes stored on the public and private clouds respectively. These sets are determined
by solving an optimization problem that minimizes the cost of executing Q over Apu and Apr . Then,
the sensitive attributes in Apu are encrypted and mapped before being stored while the non-sensitive
attributes are stored unencrypted in Apu and Apr . The query processing engine takes a query qi ∈ Q
or an ad-hoc query, qx, and transforms it into a query over a hybrid cloud. The results obtained by
executing queries on both clouds are then combined into the final result that is passed on to a user.
We use a Hadoop HDFS and Hive based cloud storage infrastructure for our implementation. Hadoop
HDFS is a distributed file system that is designed to run on commodity hardware. In our architecture,
the HDFS layer stores files that contain the vertical partitions created in the data design phase. A file
may contain unencrypted or encrypted data depending on the sensitivity of attributes stored in that file.
Hive is a data warehouse that is built on Hadoop. Hive allows a user to define structure for files that are
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stored in the underlying HDFS. Furthermore, Hive provides a user the ability to query this structured
data using a SQL-like query language called Hive QL. In our architecture, Hive is used to create the
public and private components of a relation using the vertical partitions stored in HDFS. Then, a query
q is split into two sets of sub-queries using Hive QL: qpu is executed on the public cloud, while qpr is
executed on the private cloud. The results of qpu and qpr are combined on the private cloud and then
returned to a user.
Our contributions: To address the challenges we identified earlier with hybrid clouds we present
the following novel contributions in this paper:
• Algorithmic approaches to the data partitioning problem for a hybrid cloud in which we consider
the cost of encrypted data storage on a public cloud.
• An efficient distributed query optimization and processing engine. Our engine takes into account
the cost of querying over encrypted data.
• Implementation of these functions as an add-on for a Hadoop and Hive based computing infras-
tructure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related work in the area of secure
distributed data processing. Section 3 presents details of our approach to data processing in a hybrid
cloud. In section 4 we present results of experiments conducted on our implementation. Finally, we
present our conclusions and future work in section 5.
2 Related Work
In this section we provide a brief overview of the relevant research areas that are related to our work in
this paper.
A lot of research has focused on data partitioning and distributed query processing without explicitly
considering the cost of data security. In our work, we categorically include this cost in both these areas.
Data Partitioning: A lot of research has focused on the problem of data partitioning in single [2]
and distributed systems [3] using a strategy such as that given in [4]. Reference [5] uses a graph-based,
data-driven partitioning approach for transactional workloads. Our work explicitly considers the cost of
querying encrypted attributes that will be stored on the public cloud as a result of the data partitioning
process.
Distributed Query Processing: Research efforts have also been made in the area of distributed
query processing in the cloud as given in [6]. Distributed query processing has evolved from systems such
as SDD-1 [7] that assumed homogeneous databases to DISCO [8] that operated on heterogeneous data
sources and finally to Internet scale systems such as Astrolabe [9]. Since we need to execute queries over
partitions containing unencrypted and encrypted data, we may not be able to process a query entirely
on a public or private cloud. This leads to a cost model that is different from models that currently exist
in literature.
Privacy: The area of privacy-preserving query processing has also received much attention [10, 11]. A
homomorphic encryption based technique can be used to query over encrypted data [12] but is expensive
when the data size increases. We use techniques given in [11] to preserve security of data. However, the
difference between our work and [11] is that we can store and query data locally unlike [11].
We have also identified a recent work, called Relational Cloud [10], that attempts to address the
problems we have identified above. The difference between our work and Relational Cloud is that our
data partitioning scheme considers the cost of querying encrypted attributes stored on a public cloud.
Relational Cloud partitions data using a graph-based partitioning scheme without attaching any query
cost constraints. These partitions are then encrypted with multiple layers of encryption and stored on
a server. A query is then executed over the encrypted data with multiple rounds of communication
between a client and server without considering the cost of decrypting intermediate relations. In our
work, we explicitly consider the cost of queries that involve all three components of a hybrid cloud: a
query over data in a private cloud, a query over non-sensitive (i.e., unencrypted) data and, a query over
sensitive (i.e., encrypted) data on a public cloud. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to
explicitly estimate the cost of querying over unencrypted and encrypted data in a distributed setting.
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3 Secure Data Processing
This section focuses on the security layer, the query processing engine and the data design layer in that
order. This is done since each successive layer is dependent on the concepts presented in the earlier layer.
3.1 Data Security
The data security layer prevents the cloud service provider from being able to gain any meaningful
information from the sensitive data. The main challenge in this layer is the efficient execution of queries
over encrypted data stored on a public cloud. We use the techniques given in [11] to solve this problem.
However, we can store and query data in a private cloud which was not possible in [11]. We provide a
brief overview of certain important concepts from [11] and refer the reader to [11] for a more detailed
explanation. The query processing engine makes use of these techniques to perform query rewriting that
allows an input query to be split into multiple sub-queries over a hybrid cloud.
3.1.1 Sensitive Attribute Encryption and Storage
The given set of relations, R1, R2, . . . , Rm is vertically partitioned into a partition stored on a user’s
private cloud and a partition stored on a public cloud. The public cloud partition is further fragmented
into a fragment containing sensitive data and a fragment containing non-sensitive data. We now explain
how the fragment containing sensitive data is encrypted and stored on a cloud service provider such that
queries can be run directly over the encrypted data.
The domain (Di) of a sensitive attribute Rpu.Aj is divided into z partitions, p1, p2, . . . , pz such that all
partitions taken together cover Di and no two partitions overlap one another. An identification function,
ident, assigns an identifier, identRpu.Aj(pz) to each partition of R
pu.Aj such that identRpu.Aj (py) 6=
identRpu.Aj(pz) if y 6= z. A mapping function, Map, is used to map a value v in Di of attribute
Rpu.Aj to the identifier of the partition to which v belongs: MapRpu.Aj(v) = identRpu.Aj(pz). A
value v of a sensitive attribute Rpu.Aj in a vertical partition of a relation, R
pu is then encrypted as
E(v) = 〈encrypt(v),MapRpu.Aj (v)〉. We use AES [13] in CTR mode [14] as the encryption function, E,
while MapRpu.Aj (v) acts as an index on the attribute R
pu.Aj . The corresponding decryption function,
D, then decrypts E(v) to return the original value, t, after dropping the identifier that is stored along
with the encrypted value.
3.1.2 Mapping query conditions
When a query is to be evaluated on a public cloud, the query conditions need to be mapped to conditions
over the encrypted data stored on this public cloud. For example, in a selection operation with an equality
condition, Ai = v, the value, v, is mapped to the identifier of the partition that contains v as MapAi(v).
Similar mapping conditions exist for other query conditions as shown in [11].
3.1.3 Relational operators over Partitioned Relations
For a query to execute over partitioned relations that contain sensitive attributes, the underlying rela-
tional algebra operators need to be modified to be able to use the functions ident andMap. For example
if the selection condition contains a sensitive attribute, a partial result can be computed on the public
cloud using the index for sensitive attributes, Rint = σ
pu
Mapc(C)
(Rpu). This result can then be passed back
to the query processing engine where it is filtered after being decrypted for tuples that do not match the
selection condition, σC(R) = σC(D(Rint)). The remaining relational algebra operators are implemented
in [11].
3.2 Query Processing Engine
This section describes our query optimization and processing engine. We first present our distributed
query execution cost model and then we give a query processing algorithm that is used to query a hybrid
cloud.
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3.2.1 Distributed Cost Model
Algorithm 1 is used to estimate the execution cost of Q queries using statistics for all relations. The
execution cost of a query qi in a hybrid cloud setting can be computed as:
ci = freq(qi)× (max(T
pu
l , T
pr
l ) + Tco), (1)
where T pul and T
pr
l are the local processing times on a public and private cloud respectively, and Tco is
the time to combine the intermediate results at the private cloud. The access frequency of a query qi is
given by freq(qi).
Algorithm 1 QPC()
Input: Q, SR Output: Query execution cost, c
1: c← 0
2: for i← 1 to Q.length do
3: ci ← 0
4: Divide qi into q
pu
i and q
pr
i using transformation rules
5: for j ← 1 to qpui .length do
6: if Ak ∈ Rpu in qj is sensitive then
7: MapAk(v) = identAk(pk) where v ∈ Dk of Ak
8: end if
9: ci ← ci + w2 × |R
pu
l |+ w3 ×
∣∣Rputmp∣∣ {Compute public cloud cost}
10: end for
11: for j ← 1 to qpri .length do
12: ci ← ci + w1 ×
∣∣Rprtmp∣∣ {Compute private cloud cost}
13: end for
14: ci ← ci + w4 ×
∣∣Rputmp +Rprtmp∣∣ {Combination cost}
15: c← c+ freq(qi) × ci
16: end for
17: return c
Early distributed cost models only considered minimizing the communication cost [15]. However, we
believe that Equation 1 is a generalized way to estimate the query execution cost since the communication
cost has only improved over time [16]. Further, to the best of our knowledge, our cost model is the first to
estimate the cost of query execution over unencrypted and encrypted data. The private cloud processing
time is estimated as: T prl = w1 ×
∣∣Rprtmp∣∣ (line 12). ∣∣Rprtmp∣∣ is the size of the intermediate relation at the
private cloud and weight w1 is estimated based on the private cloud infrastructure. The public cloud
processing time is evaluated as: T pul = w2 × |R
pu
l |+w3 ×
∣∣Rputmp∣∣ (line 9). Rpul is the size of the relations
over which qpui will be executed and
∣∣Rputmp∣∣ is the size of the intermediate relation created as a result of
executing qpui . Weight w2 is estimated from the public cloud infrastructure while w3 is estimated from the
network used to transfer data between the public and private clouds. Finally, Tco = w4×
∣∣Rputmp +Rprtmp∣∣
represents the time to combine intermediate results at the private cloud (line 14). Weight w4 is estimated
based on the private cloud’s capability to combine public cloud results with local results. w4 also captures
the time to decrypt relations and filter unwanted tuples. |Rtmp| is estimated based on the query operator
type. Our current work only supports simple SQL queries while we leave the support of nested queries
as future work. The running time of this algorithm is O(k) where k =
∑n
i=1 q
pu
i .length+ q
pr
i .length and
n = Q.length.
3.2.2 Distributed Query Processing
Algorithm 2 presents details of our query processing engine. This algorithm is used to execute a query
over a hybrid cloud. Algorithm 2 consists of four phases, each of which we motivate with the query given
in Figure 2 that is a modified version of Q3 of TPC-H [17] and is given as follows:
SELECT li_ok, sum(li_epr*(1-li_dis)), ord_od, ord_spr
FROM cust, ord, li
WHERE cust_mks=BU AND cust_ck = ord_ck AND li_ok = ord_ok AND ord_od < 1995-03-15 AND li_sd > 1995-03-15
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Algorithm 2 QPE()
Input: qi Output: Query result, Rres
1: Divide qi into q
pu
i and q
pr
i using transformation rules
2: Execute qpui and q
pr
i in parallel
3: for j ← 1 to qpui .length do
4: if Ak ∈ Rpu in qj is sensitive then
5: MapAk(v) = identAk(pk) where v ∈ Dk of Ak
6: end if
7: Rputmp ← Execute qj over R
pu {Public cloud execution}
8: end for
9: for j ← 1 to qpri .length do
10: Rprtmp ← Execute qj on R
pr {Private cloud execution}
11: end for
12: Rres ← Combine R
pu
tmp and R
pr
tmp {Result combination}
13: return Rres
Πli ok,τsum(li epr×(1−li dis)),ord od,ord spr
⊲⊳
ord ok = li ok
⊲⊳
cust ck = ord ck
σli sd>1995−03−15
σcust mks=BU σord od<1995−03−15 li
cust ord
(a) Original Query Plan
Πli ok,τsum(li epr×(1−li dis)),ord od,ord spr
⊲⊳
ord ck = cust ck
⊲⊳
li ok = ord ok
σcust mks=BU
σli sd>1995−03−15 σord od<1995−03−15 cust
li ord
(b) Query Rearrangement
Πli ok,τsum(li epr×(1−li dis)),ord od,ord spr
⊲⊳
ord ck = cust ck
σli sd>1995−03−15∧ord od<1995−03−15
σli ok=ord ok
D
⊲⊳pu
Mapc(li ok = ord ok)
qpu
σprcust mks=BU
qpr
σpu
Mapc(li sd>1995−03−15)
σpu
Mapc(ord od<1995−03−15)
cust
li ord
(c) Public and Private Cloud Execution
Πli ok,τsum(li epr×(1−li dis)),ord od,ord spr
⊲⊳
ord ck = cust ck
σli sd>1995−03−15∧ord od<1995−03−15∧li ok=ord ok
D qpr
⊲⊳pu
Mapc(li ok = ord ok) σ
pr
cust mks=BU
σpu
Mapc(li sd>1995−03−15)
σpu
Mapc(ord od<1995−03−15) cust
li ord
(d) Post-processing
Figure 2: Query rewriting for a join query
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We assume that the lineitem and order relations are sensitive and hence are encrypted on a public cloud
while the customer relation is stored on a private cloud. Figure 2(a) shows an execution plan for the
query which is transformed using the different phases of Algorithm 2 as given below:
Query Rearrangement: To divide a query q into qpu and qpr we use relational algebra transformation
rules. This phase will transform the query plan from Figure 2(a) to the plan given in Figure 2(b) using
the commutativity rule of the join operation for our example.
Public Cloud Execution: In this phase a generated sub-query(ies) is(are) executed over relations in
a public cloud. Figure 2(c) shows how the query plan is divided into a public cloud query, qpu, and
a private cloud query, qpr. We push as much processing to a public cloud as possible by mapping the
original query conditions to conditions over encrypted attributes using the Map function. The box on
the left hand side of Figure 2(c) represents qpu for our example.
Private Cloud Execution: A sub-query(ies) is(are) directly executed over relations in a private cloud.
The box on the right in Figure 2(c) represents the private cloud query, qpr, for our example. This query
is executed in parallel with qpu on the public cloud.
Post-processing: This phase combines the intermediate relations generated at the public and private
clouds into the final result. Figure 2(d) shows the post-processing step (qpr) for our example query. This
step decrypts the data that is received from the public cloud. Next, incorrect results are filtered from
the decrypted data by applying the original query conditions. Finally, the results from the public and
private clouds are combined and returned to a user.
3.3 Data Design Layer
The data design layer is concerned with partitioning a set of relations between a user’s private cloud and
a public cloud service provider. The process of partitioning is necessary since a user’s private cloud may
not have sufficient storage and/or processing power. This process becomes more complex in our setting
since we want to protect the privacy of a user’s data. We first define the data design problem and then
present algorithmic strategies to solve this problem.
3.3.1 Data Partitioning Problem
The data design problem in a hybrid cloud setting is defined as follows: Minimize the execution cost
of a set of queries, Q, over a distribution of attributes, A, among the public (Apu) and private (Apr)
clouds. This problem is subject to the condition that Apr .size ≤W , where W is the disk space available
on the private cloud. This is clearly an optimization problem, which we call the CLOUD-SUBSET-
SELECTION (CSS) problem. There are an exponential number of subsets of A, each of which needs to
be tested as a solution to the CSS problem. We can verify in polynomial time that the execution cost of
Q queries is less than a bound C for a given Apu and Apr. Hence, the CSS problem belongs to the class
of NP problems. Moreover, the 0-1 Knapsack Problem (0-1 KP) can be reduced to the CSS problem
making the CSS problem NP-complete. A formal proof of NP-completeness is given in Appendix A.
3.3.2 Algorithmic Solutions to Data Partitioning
We use two different algorithmic strategies to produce a close to optimal solution for the CSS problem
based on dynamic programming and hill climbing. The idea of using a dynamic programming solution to
solve the CSS problem comes from the similarity between the CSS problem and 0-1 KP. Further, the hill
climbing technique is inspired from the SDD-1 algorithm [7], which is a well known query optimization
algorithm for distributed databases.
Algorithm 3 (CSS-DP) is derived from a dynamic programming solution to 0-1 KP. However, there
are several differences between the two problems. Firstly, 0-1 KP considers items with a weight wi and
a profit pi, while the CSS problem considers attributes with a size Ai.size and an associated cost ci.
0-1 KP tries to maximize the profit P while maintaining the weight of the knapsack less than W . The
CSS problem tries to minimize the execution cost of Q queries given that Ai is placed in the private
cloud under the constraint that Apr.size ≤ W . The algorithm takes the following parameters as input:
a set of attributes A, the size of the private cloud W , a set of input queries Q and the statistics for all
relations as a set, ∀Ri ∈ R; stat(Ri) ∈ SR. Note that SR captures the partitioning of A into Apu and
Apr. Algorithm 3 begins by calling Algorithm 1 to compute an initial cost (cin) for Q queries given that
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Algorithm 3 CSS-DP()
Input: A, W , Q, SR Output: An array p
1: Update SR such that Apu = A, Apr = ∅
2: cin ← QPC(Q, SR) {Compute initial cost}
3: for i = 0 to W do
4: p[0, i]← 0
5: end for
6: for i← 1 to A.length do
7: p[i, 0]← 0
8: for j = 1 to W do
9: if Ai.size ≤ j then
10: Update SR such that Ai moved from A
pu to Apr
11: ci ← cin− QPC(Q, SR) {Compute the profit for Ai such that Apu = Apu −Ai, Apr = Ai}
12: if ci + p[i− 1, j −Ai.size] > p[i− 1, j] then
13: p[i, j]← pi + p[i− 1, j −Ai.size]
14: else
15: p[i, j]← p[i− 1, j]
16: end if
17: else
18: p[i, j]← p[i− 1, j]
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: return p
Apu = A and Apr = ∅ (line 2). Then, the profit associated with each Ai can be computed as: ci = cin−
QPC(Q,SR) using an updated SR such that Ai is moved from A
pu to Apr (line 11). Algorithm 3 then
finds the maximum profit that can be achieved over A using the profit for each Ai ∈ A. The term “profit”
is used under the assumption that the private cloud is able to process queries faster than the public cloud.
However, if the converse is true, there could be a loss in execution cost. Then, the algorithm may keep
most of the attributes in the public cloud. After execution, Algorithm 3 returns an array of size n×W ,
where n = A.length, that contains the maximum profit that can be achieved in position [n,W ]. The set
Apr can be computed by starting at p[n,W ] and tracing backwards based on the profit earned and size
associated with every attribute. Note that the running time of this algorithm O(nW × k), where k is
the running time of Algorithm 1, and the time to compute the set Apr is O(n).
Algorithm 4 CSS-HC()
Input: A, W , Q, SR, bound Output: Apu
1: Apr ← A
2: Create Apu using selected strategy. {Initial solution}
3: Update SR based on Apu and Apr
4: cin ← QPC(Q, SR) {Compute initial cost}
5: cprev ← cin; cnew ← cin + 1
6: while cnew > cprev || iter ≤ bound do
7: iter← iter + 1; cprev ← cnew
8: Randomly swap a pair of attributes from Apu and Apr to get Apun and A
pr
n such that A
pr
n ≤W
9: Update SR based on Apun and A
pr
n
10: cnew ← QPC(Q, SR) {Compute new cost}
11: end while
12: Apu ← Apun
13: return Apu
Algorithm 4 (CSS-HC) uses a hill climbing technique and takes the same input parameters as CSS-
DP. It also takes a bound on the number of random swaps to perform between Apu and Apr . An initial
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solution is built (line 2) using one of the following greedy strategies: 1) Keep as many attributes from
the query set in the private cloud as possible (CSS-HC-Query). 2) Keep as many sensitive attributes in
the private cloud as possible (CSS-HC-sensitivity). An initial execution cost (cin) of Q queries is then
computed using Algorithm 1 (line 4). A pair of attributes from Apu and Apr is then randomly swapped
(line 8) and the execution cost is recomputed (line 10). If this cost is better than the previous cost the
new partitioning is retained. If the converse is true, the process of swapping attributes and recomputing
execution cost is repeated. The total running time of the algorithm is O(bound× k) where k represents
the running time of Algorithm 1.
4 Experimental Results
This section presents the results of experiments conducted to compare the performance of the previous
two algorithms. We first present details of our experimental setup followed by the set of experiments.
Experimental Setup: Our experiments were conducted on two local clusters that are on different
sub-networks of the same university intranet. We consider that this configuration simulates a real-world
hybrid cloud well. This is because the average transfer speed between the nodes of our two local clusters
(≈ 672.04KB/sec) is the same as the average transfer speed between a node in our local network with
Amazon S31 (≈ 683.05KB/sec for encrypted data and ≈ 710.46KB/sec for unencrypted data) [18]. The
first cluster consists of 4 nodes each with a Pentium IV processor with a 250 GB hard drive and 1GB
of main memory and is used as the private cloud. The second cluster consists of 20 nodes each with a
Pentium IV processor with 290GB to 360GB disk space and 4GB main memory and is used as the public
cloud. Both clusters are setup using Hadoop2 v0.20.2 and Hive3 v0.6.0. The first cluster is configured
with ≈ 350GB disk space while the second is configured with ≈ 4.7TB of disk space for HDFS.
Security Functions: We used SHA-256 [19] as the ident function. Further, we used the built-in
datatypes, int, double and string in Hive to represent the attributes of all relations from the TPC-H
benchmark. The number of partitions, P , for a datatype could be varied from 1 to the number of unique
values in the domain of an attribute. When P = 1 we get a high degree of security, however, query
processing time increases since all values are mapped to the same partition. When P = the number of
unique values in the domain of an attribute, query processing is fast since a small subset of values is
mapped to a partition. However, the level of security is reduced since for example, a public cloud service
provider could learn the data access patterns of queries. We used the following equation to determine P :
P =
log(max−min)
log 2
, (2)
where min and max represent the minimum and maximum values for the datatype as mandated by
the TPC-H benchmark. For an integer datatype, min = −2, 147, 483, 646 and max = 2, 147, 483, 647.
This leads to n = 31 partitions using the above equation. Similarly, for a double datatype, min =
−9, 999, 999, 999.99 and max = 9, 999, 999, 999.99, leading to n = 34 partitions. For the string datatype,
we created 36 partitions as a − z and 0 − 9. Unless specified otherwise, we use these partitions in our
experiments. To encrypt subsets of attributes we used the AES [13] in CTR mode [14] from the Java
cryptographic extension.
Queries: We have used the TPC-H benchmark [17] with a scale factor 300 (≈ 323GB) in our
experiments. We did not run experiments for larger databases since we think the current case gives us
sufficient insight into the workings of the algorithmic strategies. The first experiment used Q10 of TPC-H
without the grouping and aggregate operations. The next two experiments used a query workload of
100 queries containing modified versions of TPC-H queries Q1, Q3, Q6 and Q10. In particular, we do
not perform grouping and aggregate operations in any query. Further, freq(qi) was randomly selected
between 1 and 1000. Additional details of the workload preparation are given in Appendix B.2.
Preliminary Experiments: We ran a set of preliminary experiments to estimate the weights defined
in our cost model. These experiments were run only once and generate weights that are effective as will
be shown. The values generated were: w1 = 0.000545146, w2 = 0.000072686, w3 = 0.000001488 and
w4 = 0.0000041. Details of these preliminary experiments are provided in Appendix B.1.
1http://aws.amazon.com/s3/
2http://hadoop.apache.org/
3http://hive.apache.org/
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Figure 3: Comparison of CSS-DP and CSS-HC when the number of partitions, P , is varied
Experiment with changing the number of partitions (P ): The aim of this experiment was to
compare the algorithms when P is increased while the private cloud size (≈ 90GB) and the sensitivity
of attributes (≈ 50%) are fixed4. Further, we wanted to show that although w1 > w2, the choice of P
affects the query performance on the public cloud. The solid and dashed lines in Figure 3 represent the
running times when Apu = A (All-Public) and Apr = A (All-Private) respectively. The running time
is constant for All-Private as it does not use partitions for query processing. For All-Public, the time
decreases as P is increased. When P is small, the query takes longer to perform a join on the public
cloud, since a large number of values map to the same partition. More time is also spent in transferring
data to, and decrypting data on, the private cloud. As P increases, the time needed to perform a join
as well as the transfer and decryption time reduces. Both the CSS-HC techniques perform similar to
All-Private. This is because they always leave attributes from the query set or sensitive attributes, in
the private cloud. When P is small, CSS-DP picks attributes such that Aj ∈ Apr when Aj ∈ Q. The
distribution of data for CSS-DP in such a case, for example for P = 4 is: about 76% data in the public
cloud and 24% data in the private cloud. This leads to a running time that is better than All-Public
and All-Private. However, as P increases more attributes from the query set are pushed to the public
cloud. This is because the time taken to perform a join on the public cloud followed by decrypting and
filtering intermediate results is much lesser than performing the query on the private cloud.
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Figure 4: Comparison of CSS-DP and CSS-HC when the private cloud size, W , is scaled
Experiment with changing the private cloud size (W ): The goal of this experiment is to
4Our running times are very similar to the timings in [20] even though we use a less powerful cluster than [20].
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compare the performance of our algorithms when W increases while the sensitivity of attributes is fixed
randomly (at ≈ 40% over all relations) and the default partitions of 31, 34 and 36 are used. The dashed
line in Figure 4 represents the running time for All-Private. Further, All-Public and CSS-DP overlap
in Figure 4. This is expected since from Figure 3 we see that the running times for these two cases are
similar for P ≥ 15. CSS-DP performs much better than CSS-HC. When an attribute Ai ∈ Q is moved
from Apu to Apr, it would result in a loss in execution cost. Therefore, CSS-DP picks attributes such
that Aj ∈ Apr when Aj /∈ Q. This is expected, since w1 > w2, however, this is not a general trend as was
shown by the previous experiment. On the other hand, both CSS-HC techniques start with an initial
solution that is iteratively improved. However, since w1 > w2, the initial estimate of execution cost is
already much higher than the CSS-DP case. Hence, a random swap of any Ai ∈ A between Apu and Apr
does not change the execution cost significantly. For the W = 10% case, the CSS-HC techniques perform
better than for the other W cases. The CSS-HC techniques store most of the attributes needed by the
query set on the public cloud and hence query processing is much faster. As W scales, more attributes
from the query set are brought into the private cloud. Therefore, the processing time becomes as slow
as the case when Apr = A.
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Figure 5: Comparison of CSS-DP and CSS-HC when attribute sensitivities, S, are increased
Experiment with changing sensitivities (S): This experiment measures the time to run the
workload when W is fixed (at ≈ 150GB) while S is varied from some attributes being sensitive to all
being sensitive. Figure 5 shows a comparison of the algorithmic strategies and we see results that are
similar to Figure 4. CSS-DP selects attributes such that Aj ∈ Apr when Aj /∈ Q; this makes the query
execution time for the workload much faster. The CSS-HC strategies select an initial solution based on
the selected criteria (query or sensitivity). Again, since w1 > w2, neither of these strategies produces
a good workload execution time when compared with CSS-DP. For the S = 30% case the CSS-HC-
sensitivity technique produces a query workload time that is better than the other S cases. This is
because the initial solution and subsequent random swaps leave most of the query set attributes in the
public cloud.
General Observations: We observe that for some cases of CSS-HC the execution time is higher
than when Apr = A. This is due to the additional time for the post-processing step. We also observe that
the weights estimated by the preliminary experiments perform well. The weights capture the purpose
for which they were measured as shown by the weights for private (w1) and public (w2) cloud processing.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
With the advent of cloud computing, a hybrid cloud may be suitable for users who wish to balance data
security with scalable data processing. We have identified three challenges that must be overcome before
this approach can be adopted.
The first challenge deals with data partitioning between a private cloud and a service provider when
there are sensitive attributes in the data. We have developed two algorithmic approaches that produce
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a close to optimal solution to this optimization problem. The second challenge is how to store a user’s
data securely on a cloud service provider? We have used existing encryption techniques to store a user’s
sensitive data on the cloud service provider. Moreover, this technique allows us to push most of the query
processing work to the cloud service provider without the need of decrypting the stored data. Finally,
the last challenge addresses the problem of distributed query processing over unencrypted and encrypted
data. We have developed a cost model that estimates the cost of query execution over unencrypted and
encrypted data. We have also presented a query processing engine that splits a user query into a public
and private cloud query(ies). Each of these query(ies) is(are) then executed at each site using the best
available local query plan.
We are exploring the following areas for future research: 1) We have only considered a vertical
partitioning of relations in this paper which will be extended to include horizontal and hybrid partitioning
schemes. 2) Our cost model considers only simple SQL queries. We plan to build a more sophisticated
model with support for nested queries. 3) In this paper we used Hadoop and Hive as the underlying
cloud computing technologies. We aim to extend this work with more experiments into a generalized
tool that will work with other existing public cloud services.
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A The CSS Problem is NP-complete
Given: A set of relations, R = {R1, R2, . . . , Rm}, a set of attributes, A = {A1, A2, . . . , An} over all rela-
tions R where an attribute Aj ∈ {sensitive, non-sensitive}, a set of input queries, Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk}.
Problem: We have the following optimization problem for CLOUD-SUBSET-SELECTION (CSS),
minimize
X
k∑
i=1
freq(qi)×QPCqi(X)
subject to
n∑
j=1
s(Aj)× xj ≤ PRIVATE CLOUD SIZE
where xj =
{
1 if Aj is in the private cloud;
0 if Aj is in the public cloud,
and s(Aj) denotes the size of attribute Aj .
We convert the optimization problem to a decision problem:
Problem: Is there a partitioning of A into Apu and Apr such that the cost of executing Q queries over
X = {Apu, Apr} is at most C, where Aj ∈ A
pu if the corresponding xj = 0 and Aj ∈ A
pr if the
corresponding xj = 1?
Lemma A.1. The CSS problem belongs to the class NP.
Proof. We shall provide a two-input, polynomial-time algorithm Al that can verify CSS. One of the
inputs to the algorithm Al is a set of queries Q while the other input is a certificate corresponding to a
partitioning of the attribute set A into Apu and Apr.
Algorithm Al is constructed as follows: For each query qi ∈ Q, Al determines the cost of executing
qi given the partitions A
pu and Apr, i.e., QPCqi(X). We assume that QPCqi(X) can be computed in
polynomial time. If the sum of execution costs of all queries Q is less than the bound C, the algorithm
outputs 1, since the partitioning of A into Apu and Apr provides a cost less than or equal to the bound
C. Otherwise, Al outputs 0.
Whenever a partitioning of A into Apu and Apr that produces an execution cost over all queries Q
that is less than or equal to C is input to algorithm Al, there is a certificate whose length is polynomial
in the size of A and that causes Al to output a 1. Whenever a partitioning of A into Apu and Apr that
produces an execution cost greater than C is input, algorithm Al outputs a 0. Algorithm Al runs in
polynomial time. Thus, CSS can be verified in polynomial time, and CSS ∈ NP.
Lemma A.2. The CSS problem is NP-hard.
Proof. To prove that CSS is NP-hard we show that the 0-1 Knapsack Problem (KP) ≤P CSS. We show
that any instance of 0-1 KP can be reduced in polynomial time to an instance of the CSS problem.
We first define 0-1 KP as follows: Given a set of n items and a knapsack, with pj = profit of item j,
wj = weight of item j, c = capacity of the knapsack, select a subset of items so as to
maximize z =
n∑
j=1
pjxj
subject to
n∑
j=1
wjxj ≤ c,
where xj =
{
1 if item j is selected;
0 otherwise
and j ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
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We convert this problem into the following minimization problem subject to the same conditions as
before,
minimize z =
n∑
j=1
−pjxj
0-1 KP can then be recast as the following decision problem: Can we achieve a profit of at most P
without exceeding the weight c?
The reduction algorithm begins with an instance of 0-1 KP. Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be the set of items
each of which is associated with a profit pj and weight wj , where j ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Also, let c be the
capacity of the knapsack. We will construct an instance of the CSS problem with a set of attributes A
over all relations R from the set of n items such that the 0-1 KP instance is satisfiable if and only if the
CSS instance is satisfiable. Satisfiability in these problems means that the decision problem is answered
with a ‘yes’. The instance of the CSS problem is constructed as follows:
For every item xj ∈ X , the instance of the CSS problem has an attribute Aj . Further, the weight
wj of an item xj corresponds to the size of the attribute Aj , i.e., wj = s(Aj). An initial cost, cin is
computed such that Apu = A and Apr = ∅. Then, the profit of item xj corresponds to the execution
cost of Q queries (denoted as cj) over a partitioning of A into X as given in the minimization problem of
CSS such that Aj ∈ Apr . The profit can be computed as: cj = cin −
∑k
i=1 freq(qi) ×QPCqi(X). This
means that pjxj = cjxj where xj = 1 for Aj in the CSS problem. Then, the total profit P becomes the
execution cost, C, over all queries Q. Also the total capacity of the knapsack, c, becomes the size of the
private cloud, PRIVATE CLOUD SIZE, which is computed as
∑n
j=1 s(Aj)× xj ; ∀xj = 1. This instance
of CSS can easily be computed from the instance of 0-1 KP in polynomial time.
We now show that this transformation is a reduction under the assumption that QPCqi(X) can be
computed in polynomial time for any query qi ∈ Q. First, suppose that the given instance of 0-1 KP is
satisfiable. Then, we have a subset X¯ ⊆ X such that the total profit P¯ =
∑n
j=1 pj∀x ∈ X¯ ≤ P . We
claim that X¯ corresponds to Apr . Any element Aj will only be added to A
pr when both conditions:
cj ≤ C and
∑n
j=1 s(Aj)× xj ≤ PRIVATE CLOUD SIZE, hold.
Conversely, suppose that the CSS problem instance has a partitioning of A into Apu and Apr that
satisfies all constraints. Every xj corresponding to an Aj ∈ Apr can be selected from the instance of 0-1
KP to form the set of elements that will achieve at most profit P . This is because, each xj will achieve
at most profit pj ≤ P and weight wj ≤ c.
Theorem A.3. The CSS problem is NP-complete.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas A.1 and A.2 and the definition of NP.
B Additional Details of the Experiments
The TPC-H benchmark is a decision support benchmark that consists of a schema that is typical of
any business organization [17]. The TPC-H benchmark provides a system that inspects large amounts
of data by executing queries with a high degree of complexity that are derived from critical business
questions. The TPC-H benchmark consists of 8 relations and 22 queries having a realistic context that
capture the business activities of a wholesale supplier [17].
B.1 Preliminary Experiments
A set of preliminary experiments was run to estimate the weights w1 to w4 that are used in out cost model.
Weights w1 and w2 represent the local processing times on the private and public clouds respectively
and are estimated by running the same set of 4 queries on both the clouds. These queries consist of Q1,
Q5 and Q13 from TPC-H [17] while the 4th query is as follows:
select * from lineitem l join orders o on l.l_orderkey = o.o_orderkey
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The four queries were selected to have a mix of low and high selectivity. From the average running times
of each query we determined w1 as w1 =
t1
b1
+ t2
b2
+ t3
b3
+ t4
b4
. t1 represents the time to run Q1 on the private
cloud and b1 represents the number of bytes generated in the result of an execution of Q1. The weight
w2 is computed in the same way as w1. Using this procedure we have estimated, w1 = 0.000545146 and
w2 = 0.000072686. Since w1 > w2, the private cloud processing is slower than public cloud processing
for our hybrid cloud. However, this is not a general rule and the converse may also be true. Our cost
model and partitioning algorithms capture either of these behaviors.
Weight w3 denotes the time required to transfer R
pu
tmp to the private cloud and is estimated using the
following query:
select * from lineitem limit x,
where we vary x from 10% to 100% of the number of tuples in the lineitem relation. This query was
selected since the lineitem relation is the largest of all the TPC-H relations and w3 can be best estimated
when a large amount of data is transferred. We then estimated w3 = 0.000001488 by averaging the
running time of the previous 10 queries.
The weight w4 is used to capture the time taken at the private cloud to combine the intermediate
results, Rputmp and R
pr
tmp, obtained from the public and private clouds respectively. The same query used
to estimate w3 was also used to estimate w4. However, the lineitem relation was partitioned between the
public and private clouds in the following way:
Private cloud: l_orderkey l_partkey l_quantity l_linestatus l_shipdate l_shipinstruct
Public cloud sensitive: l_suppkey l_linenumber l_extendedprice l_commitdate l_shipmode
Public cloud non-sensitive: l_disocunt l_tax l_returnflag l_receiptdate l_comment
The weight w4 = 0.0000041 was then estimated by averaging the time to combine the results obtained
from the different partitions for the given 10 queries.
B.2 Query Workload Preparation
We prepared a TPC-H database of scale factor 300 (≈ 323GB) using the TPC-H dbgen tool. We also
created a query workload of 100 queries using 4 TPC-H queries (Q1, Q3, Q6 and Q10). For each of these
queries the predicates in the query are randomly modified to vary the range of the data that is accessed.
We summarize the ranges used for each predicate below:
1992-01-01 <= l_shipdate <= 1998-12-31
c_mktsegment = {AUTOMOBILE, BUILDING, FURNITURE, MACHINERY, HOUSEHOLD}
1992-01-01 <= o_orderdate <= 1998-12-31
0.00 <= l_discount <= 0.10
1 <= l_quantity <= 50
l_returnflag = {R, A, N}
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